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Abstract 
Over 35 percent of the adult use mobile money services in 2014, just five years since its 
inception in Uganda. Using household survey data covering 820 rural households, we 
examine the effect of this financial innovation on their financial behavior. We find that 
adopting mobile money services significantly increases the likelihood of saving, borrowing 
and receiving remittances due to reduction in transaction cost. The amount of savings, credit 
and remittances is also significantly higher among user households than non-users. To 
illustrate the importance of service proximity, we show that reducing the distance to the 
nearest mobile money agent boosts the frequency of using mobile money services. Our 
results are robust to specification changes and alternative explanations. 
 
Key words: mobile money, financial inclusion, rural households, financial services, Uganda. 
JEL (O16, O17, O33, I131) 
 
                                                          
*This work was supported by MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), Global 
Center of Excellency and JSPS KANENHI Grant Number 25101002. All errors remain ours. 
†Munyegera: Corresponding author/presenter; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-1 Roppongi, 
Minato-ku, Tokyo106-8677, Japan (email: kasimgm@gmail.com) 
‡Matsumoto: Co-author; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo106-8677, Japan (email: tmatsumo@grips.ac.jp) 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial sector development is a crucial element of the development process as it improves 
the mobilization of savings, allocation of capital funds, monitoring of the use of funds and 
aiding in risk management (Levine, 1997). Access to financial services like saving, money 
transfer, insurance and credit has enormous potential to shape people’s livelihoods through 
poverty and vulnerability reduction (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Beck et al., 2004; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008; Odhiambo, 2009). However, majority of the world’s poor have 
no access to these basic financial services (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). The lack of 
access to affordable financial services limits their ability to smooth consumption and 
undertake productive investments. The rural poor in developing countries have the least 
access to such services and ultimately, their capacity to escape chronical poverty is greatly 
curtailed (Dupas and Robinson, 2008).  
Mobile money has been dramatically changing the situation since its recent inception 
in some developing countries. Mobile money is a financial product that allows users to make 
basic financial transactions via a mobile phone. This financial innovation has come to the 
limelight in the financial access literature over the recent years because of its potential to 
foster financial access especially among the financially excluded rural poor in developing 
countries (Jack and Suri, 2011; Hughes and Lonie, 2007). Indeed, mobile money has 
expanded rapidly over the past decade especially in the developing world where the 
penetration rate of formal financial services is very low. The dramatic expansion of mobile 
phone network coverage, combined with the rapid adoption of mobile phone devices in the 
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past decade explains much of the success registered by Mobile Money in low-income 
countries (USAID, 2010). The period between 2000 and 2011 has been dubbed the mobile 
revolution decade, with mobile phone subscriptions increasing from 10 percent to 80 percent 
(IC4D, 2012).1 Approximately 79 percent of the population in developing countries had 
access to a mobile phone by the end of 2011 while over 50 percent of Africans owned a 
mobile phone in 2009, compared to 20 percent with a formal bank account (McKinsey, 2009). 
There has been a growing body of literature that identifies the factors behind the high 
incidence of financial exclusion, including socio-cultural factors (Sarma and Pais, 2011; 
Johnson and Nino-Zarazua, 2011), long distance to the financial institution (Pedrosa and Do, 
2011) and high cost of account maintenance (Dupas and Robinson, 2013).2 In low-income 
countries, formal financial institutions like commercial banks and deposit-taking micro-
finance institutions are concentrated in urban centers. This implies that access to formal 
financial services by the rural populace is complicated by the long and costly treks made to 
access service points in urban locations. Besides, the high cost of operating a bank account 
imposes a challenge to the adoption of formal financial services especially among the low-
income people. An experimental study by Dupas and Robinson (2013) reveals that access to 
non-interest-bearing savings accounts increased savings and investments among market 
vendors in Kenya. The study emphasizes the importance of service cost as a critical factor in 
the uptake of financial services among low-income communities. 
                                                          
1 Information and Communication for Development 
2 Financially excluded constitutes individuals who cannot either access or afford to use the services offered 
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The lack of access to a formal financial institution in rural communities imposes a 
high cost of transferring money especially over long distances and this is often exacerbated 
by poor road conditions. Physical transfer of money is a common channel of remittances 
among the financially excluded rural communities despite the relatively high risk of theft and 
the high transport and time cost involved in this exchange mechanism. The low cost of mobile 
banking relative to conventional banking implies an increase in the flow of remittances 
among family members and friends (Mbiti and Weil, 2011) which greatly improves the 
welfare of recipient households (Munyegera and Matsumoto, forthcoming). The general lack 
of access to formal financial institutions partly accounts for the rapid adoption of mobile 
money services as an invaluable alternative for the financially excluded rural poor (World 
Economic Forum report, 2011). 
Empirical research on informal insurance and risk sharing indicate that the 
availability of a cheap remittance channel increases the incidence of risk sharing and reduces 
vulnerability to income and consumption shocks. Using panel data from Kenya, Jack and 
Suri (2014) illustrated that households that used M-PESA - Kenya’s most famous mobile 
money platform – were able to receive remittances to offset the effect of illness and weather 
shocks which caused a notable reduction in consumption expenditure among non-user 
households. Although most studies on mobile banking concentrate on peer-to-peer transfer 
services, which is the most common service offered across the mobile money platform given 
its infancy, the product supports business to person, business-to-business and government-
to-person services at a relatively lower cost than conventional transfer platforms like 
commercial banks. A study by Aker et al. (2011) in Niger demonstrated that the use of mobile 
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banking reduced the cost to the government and recipients of a welfare program that 
distributed financial assistance to the people affected by the critical drought of 2008.  
Despite the increasing importance of mobile banking, there is little empirical 
evidence on the potential of this financial innovation with regards to services beyond money 
transfer. Mobile money now offers a broader range of services including an integrated access 
to formal bank services through partnerships between Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) 
and registered commercial banks and deposit-taking microfinance institutions (MFIs). Other 
services like the electronic payment of school fees, salaries and utility bills (in principle, 
water and electricity) are expected to reduce the frequencies of cash transactions and increase 
financial efficiency (USAID, 2012). Safaricom’s M-PESA in Kenya now offers an integrated 
financial package with extended services like microsavings, credit and agricultural insurance 
through customized platforms called M-KESHO and Kilimo Safi. It is documented that access 
to an affordable savings platform can change financial behaviors of households by reducing 
wasteful expenditure and saving with informal platforms (Morawczynski and Pickens 2009).  
Although considerable effort has been devoted to studying the developmental impact 
of mobile money in the areas of remittances, risk sharing and consumption smoothing, 
empirical evidence on its potential to boost savings, credit, insurance and mobile payments 
remains largely missing. In the context of Uganda, mobile money studies focus on the 
determinants of adoption (Johnson and Nino-Zarazua, 2011) while others rely on small and 
less-representative samples (Ndiwalana, 2010). The objective of this study is to fill literature 
gap by analyzing the effect of mobile money on the saving, credit and remittance behaviors 
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of rural households in Uganda. The study is expected to contribute to the existing literature 
by assessing the potential of mobile money to enhance financial inclusion, extending the 
analysis beyond peer-to-peer remittances to savings and credit.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 provides background 
information on mobile money in Uganda and Section 3 describes the survey data and their 
summary statistics. We describe the empirical strategy in Section 4 and provide our results 
in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes the analysis. 
2. Development of mobile money service in Uganda. 
In March 2009, Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) – the leading Mobile Network Operator 
in the country – established MTN Mobile Money, the first mobile money platform in the 
country, inspired by the massive success of Safaricom’s M-PESA in Kenya. Airtel Uganda, 
formerly known as Zain, joined the service when it rolled out its Airtel Money in June the 
same year. This new financial innovation proved to be an efficient way for telecom 
companies to increase their market shares by widening the range of services available to their 
clients. This attracted Uganda Telecom to introduce M-Sente in March 2010, followed by 
Warid Pesa from Warid Telecom in December 2011 and Orange Money from Orange 
Telecom in the first half of 2012 (Uganda Communications Commission-UCC 2012). 
Since mobile money was established in Uganda, the number of subscribers has been 
steadily increasing. By mid-2014, over 17.6 million Ugandans had adopted mobile money 
services, representing over a five-fold expansion from 3 million users in 2011. In the same 
period, the number of mobile money transactions increased from 180 million to 242 million 
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and the corresponding total value exchanged through the platform increased from $1.5 billion 
to $4.5 billion in the same period (BoU, 2012). The MTN Mobile Money alone has over 
15,000 agents as compared with 455 commercial bank branches with 660 Automated Teller 
Machines (ATMs).3 This rapid expansion partly owes to the high rates of both the roll-out of 
mobile phone networks and adoption of mobile phones. In our survey sample households, 
the proportion of households owning a mobile phone increased from 73 percent to 90 percent 
between 2012 and 2014 while all of the Local Council 1s (hereafter called LC1s) were 
covered by mobile phone network in both rounds. 4  One in four households reported 
possessing more than one mobile phone in the Mobile Money survey of 2014 (hereafter 
referred to as MM2014). 
Mobile money allows users to deposit money as e-float on a SIM card-based account, 
called an m-wallet, which can be converted into cash at any mobile money agent located all 
over the country. In the initial stage of its establishment, the range of services offered was 
largely limited to person-to-person money transfer. However, with the growing interest from 
stake-holders, coupled with competition among the mobile network operators (MNOs), 
service providers have gradually innovated to widen the range of services. Currently, most 
MNOs offer more complex functions like payment of utility bills, school fees, airtime 
purchase, direct purchase of goods and services and, to some extent, payment of government 
taxes. Recent developments in the mobile banking arena have made it possible for users to 
access their bank accounts using their mobile phones without having to physically visit their 
                                                          
3 Mobile money agents serve as outlet centers or cash points where users can exchange their e-float for cash 
and vice versa. 
4 LC1 is the smallest administrative unit in Uganda. 
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bank branches, thanks to the partnership between MNOs and commercial banks.5 This is 
expected to raise financial inclusion especially at the lower end of the socio-economic 
spectrum while reducing the cost of access to and use of basic financial services.  
With the rapid urbanization in Uganda over the past years, the number of people 
migrating to urban centers has been steadily increasing, most often in pursuit of jobs. Those 
who migrate to cities often extend financial support to their family members and friends in 
villages in the form of remittances and informal loans. The efficiency of this remittance 
system used to heavily rely on the quality of transport infrastructure as most of these 
transactions were traditionally made through informal channels like physical movement of 
cash by the receiver, sender, and agents like bus and taxi drivers. Besides, the massive 
geographical dispersion between senders and receivers implies high transaction costs in 
terms of transport fares and travel time involved in sending and receiving money among 
family members and friends especially across geographically distant and remote locations. 
This background motivates our postulation that mobile money lowers the time, transport and 
other transaction costs associated with the usage of financial services, catalyzing their 
adoption even by rural households. Similarly, the financial product has made it easier for 
friends and relatives to exchange informal credit while others find it convenient and cost-
effective to save money over the m-wallet in instances where commercial banks are 
inaccessible.  
                                                          
5Major partnerships exist between MTN Mobile Money and Stanbic Bank, M-Sente and Standard Chartered 
Bank and WaridPesa and DFCU Bank. 
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3. Data and Summary Statistics 
This paper uses a combination of two data sources - the Research on Poverty, Environment 
and Agricultural Technology (RePEAT) and MM2014. The RePEAT is a panel household 
survey conducted jointly by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), the 
Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID) and Makerere 
University in four rounds between 2003 and 2012.  
The survey collected detailed information on household consumption, incomes, 
agricultural production from 940 rural households in 94 LC1s. We followed up 916 
households that were interviewed in the last round of the RePEAT in 2012 and conducted a 
MM2014 among these households between June and July 2014 particularly in order to collect 
the detail information on the use of financial services. We successfully interviewed 820 out 
of the 916 households and asked questions about the usage of mobile money, banks, Savings 
and Credit Associations (SACCOs) and Micro-finance Institutions (MFIs) as well as 
financial services including savings, remittances and credit (both formal and informal). 
Analysis is based on 820 households that were interviewed in 2014, constructing financial 
access and usage variables from the MM2014 while information on household characteristics 
is obtained from RePEAT4.6  The choice of rural households as our analysis sample is 
intended to portray the contribution of mobile money among the rural poor who are often 
excluded from the formal financial system. 
                                                          
6 We were unable to construct a panel because financial access and usage variables are not available in 
RePEAT surveys except mobile money adoption and remittances transactions. 
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We provide summary statistics for financial access and usage by mobile money 
adoption status in Table 1 and household and village characteristics in Table 2. During just 
two years between the RePEAT4 and the MM2014, the proportion of households with at 
least one mobile money user increased almost two-fold from 38 percent to 70 percent and 
barely one percent of the sample households had a mobile money user in the third round of 
the RePEAT in 2009. This reflects a rapid penetration within just five years since mobile 
money was introduced in Uganda in 2009. The rapid adoption of mobile money services is 
partly attributed to the high adoption rate of mobile phones and the lack of rural coverage by 
formal financial institutions.7 Over 80 percent of the households in the MM2014 had at least 
one mobile phone with one in four households possessing more than one handset. The 
significantly higher rate of mobile phone possession among mobile money users is not 
surprising given the nature of the mobile money platform which uses the mobile phone as 
infrastructure for the services offered. In contrast, only 41 and 13 percent of mobile money 
adaptors and non-adaptors have at least one bank account, respectively.  Table 2 further 
shows that households that adopt mobile money services have more educated heads with an 
average difference of two years of schooling.  
Peer-to-peer remittance is the most commonly adopted function of the mobile money 
platform. The proportion of mobile money users who report having received remittances at 
least once in the 12 months before the MM2014 interview date is thus ten percent higher 
compared to non-users. Similarly, the amount of remittances received is twice as high at 
                                                          
7 These include commercial banks and deposit-taking MFIs. 
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UGX 702,000 (USD 270) and UGX 325,000 (USD 125) for users and non-users, respectively. 
The user households are also more likely to save and borrow money and the amount saved 
and borrowed is significantly higher. We postulate that mobile money provides a convenient 
channel not only for remittances but also for short-term savings mainly for school fees to be 
drawn at the onset of a new school term or for purchasing agricultural inputs when the 
planting season starts.8 Mobile money users are generally wealthier than non-users in terms 
of both asset and land endowments.  
The user households tend to be less female-headed and have younger heads than the 
non-users. Regarding physical access to financial service providers, the user households are 
located one kilometer closer to the mobile money agent than the non-user households while 
there are no significant differences in distance to banks because our sample is predominantly 
rural and majority of banks are located in the district town which is, on average, tens of 
kilometers away from the village center. Although there are systematic differences in the 
individual and LC1 level characteristics between the mobile money users and non-users, the 
simple comparison of their outcome variables on savings, credit use, and remittance receipt 
would not identify the causal effect of adoption of the mobile money. Thus, we discuss about 
our identification strategy in the following section.  
[ Insert Table 1 here ] 
                                                          
8 According to the survey data and also the observation through focus group discussions, the two main purposes 
of receiving remittances, saving and borrowing money in the sample are to raise school fees and make farm 
investments which include hiring labor and buying inputs. 
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4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1. Adoption of Financial Services  
A household’s decision to use a particular financial service depends on household and 
community characteristics in the form: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
ℎ  = 1{𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1ℎ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ  > 0},   (1)  
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ  is a dummy variable taking one if the household i living in the village j of 
the district d has at least one member who uses z financial service h, and h comprises of 
savings, credit and remittances. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a dummy variable taking one if the household 
has at least one member who uses mobile money services. The parameter ɳd captures district 
fixed effects. Xijd is a vector of household characteristics which include household size, log 
of asset value and land endowments, age, gender and education level of the household head. 
Vjd is a vector of observed village characteristics that could potentially influence the 
household’s decision on the use of those financial services. These include a distance measure 
in kilometers from the village center to the nearest district town and also distance measures 
to the nearest respective service providers. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ  is a disturbance term. Under the 
independence assumption of the disturbance term from the mobile money dummy, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, conditioning on the observed characteristics, Xijd and Vjd , and the district fixed 
effect, ɳd , we are able to obtain unbiased estimates of the coefficients of the model and, hence, 
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the average effect of the mobile money adoption.9 We run several regressions with different 
assumptions on the functional form of the disturbance term, including the Probit, Logit, and 
liner probability model estimation. They generate similar estimates of the average mobile 
money effects. We will report the Probit results in the following section. 
4.2 Amount of Financial Services. 
In order to understand the extent to which mobile money influences financial service usage, 
we estimate the amount of money saved, borrowed and received in remittances by the 
household within 12 months prior to the survey.10 Since the amount of financial services 
transacted is observed only if the household used the service, we adopt a Tobit approach 
which allows us to consistently estimate the total value of financial services by considering 
the outcome variable for non-users as censored at zero as the lower limit: 
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ℎ = Max{0, 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝛾𝛾1ℎ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ } ,      (2)       
where 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ  is the amount of money saved, borrowed or received as remittances in the 
12 months preceding MM2014 and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a disturbance term and assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
. This specification relies crucially on normality 
                                                          
9  The conditional independence assumption may look too restrictive because of possible unobservables 
affecting the mobile money use and outcome variables. We will discuss about the possible endogeneity of the 
mobile money dummy in the following section. 
10 Dissaving from other assets is not included in the definition of reported savings. Analysis in this paper does 
not consider net saving (income less expenditure). 
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of the distribution of the disturbance term. Considering its lognormality, we also estimate the 
specification with the log-transformed value of 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ .11 
Because systematic differences in observed characteristics between mobile money 
users and non-users could be driving the differences in the patterns of savings, credit and 
remittances, we also conduct propensity score matching to identify the true effect of mobile 
money adoption based on comparable user and non-user households. In order to force a 
common support between users and non-users and improve covariate distributions, we trim 
the sample to include matched households for which the estimated propensity score lies 
between 0.1 and 0.9. Crump et al. (2008a) draw on empirical examples and numerical 
calculations to illustrate that this cut-off point often yields good results. In addition to the 
conventional matching techniques, we run weighted regressions with a full set of covariates 
with weights assigned by the estimated propensity score. Controlling for covariates gives 
double robustness by further smoothing out potential heterogeneity between treated and 
untreated observations (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). 
  In addition to the full set of household characteristics presented earlier, we also 
include the log of distance in kilometers to each of the nearest financial service provider – 
mobile money agent, bank, SACCO and MFI as additional controls.  
                                                          
11 Although a Tobit regression model for lognormal data introduces two complications: a nonzero threshold 
and lognormal of the dependent variable, we followed the method introduced in Cameron and Trivedi (Ch.16, 
2010) and estimated the model. Both methods generate the similar estimate results on the marginal effects. 
We will present the results obtained by the Tobit regression model for lognormal data in the following 
section. The normal Tobit regression results will be given by the authors upon request. 
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4.3 Mechanisms: Convenience of Using Financial Service Providers. 
We postulate that the relatively lower service charges and the convenience associated with 
closer proximity to financial service providers in terms of reduced travel time and transport 
costs is the major mechanism through which mobile money boosts savings, credit and 
remittances. The relative urban concentration of formal financial service providers (banks 
and MFIs) implies that physical access to financial institutions remains one of the major 
challenges for rural households to adopt these financial services. If long distance to service 
points is a major barrier for rural households to adopt financial services, bringing these 
services closer could leverage the households’ likelihood and frequency of the respective 
service providers. 12  To test the plausibility of this premise, we estimate a system of 
seemingly unrelated regressions for the likelihood and frequency of using each of the four 
service providers, taking into account the possibility that the household’s decisions to adopt 
them are interdependent.   
5. Results  
5.1. Adoption of Financial Services 
We first estimate the decision of the household to save money, receive remittances and credit. 
In odd-numbered columns of Table 3, the access to mobile money services is measured as a 
dummy variable taking one if any household member used mobile money services in the past 
12 months while the distance from the household’s village to the nearest mobile money agent 
                                                          
12 About 20 and 24 percent of the sample households which have never used banks and MFIs, respectively 
site long distance to service provider as the principal barrier. 
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is used an alternative access measure in even-numbered columns. The dependent variables 
take one if any member of the household made any form of saving or received any credit 
(both formal and informal) or remittance within 12 months prior to the interview date. Having 
a mobile money user in the household increases the probability of saving, borrowing and 
receiving remittance by 25, 22 and 82 percentage points, respectively. Assets play a 
significant role in stimulating remittance receipt but do not systematically explain saving and 
credit patterns. Distance to the nearest mobile money agent seems to matter strictly for 
remittances with no significant effect on the likelihoods of saving and borrowing money.  
[ Insert Table 3 here ] 
5.2. Amount of Financial Services. 
Estimating the likelihood of adopting financial services using binary outcome variables does 
not disclose the extent to which the mobile money service stimulates financial transactions 
and conceals any possible heterogeneity across households in terms of service amounts 
transacted. We thus estimate the amount of savings made and credit and remittances received 
12 months before the survey and present the results in Table 4. Odd-numbered columns report 
ordinary Tobit results while even-numbered columns include residuals from the Probit 
regression of mobile money adoption to control for potential endogeneity of mobile money 
variable. Across both specifications, the presence of a mobile money user in the household 
has a positive and significant effect on the annual amount of money a household saves, 
borrows or receives in remittances. As discussed in previous sections, we presuppose that 
rural households use mobile money to make temporary savings especially for school fees and 
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financing agricultural investments like input purchase, labor hiring and land preparation. For 
similar purposes, households could use mobile money as a channel through which they solicit 
informal soft loans and remittances from family members and friends especially those 
working outside the village. Household size does not significantly affect credit and 
remittance amounts but reduces the amount of money saved, which could be partly attributed 
to the huge expenditures needs associated with large families that strain the saving ability of 
these households.  
[ Insert Table 4 here ] 
[ Insert Table 5 here ] 
We then estimate reduced form Tobit models using the distance to the nearest mobile 
money agent as an exogenous measure of mobile money access. We also control for the 
distances to the nearest bank, SACCO and MFI as this could influence financial service 
transactions besides mobile money access. Results in Table 5 reveal that the distance from 
the village center to the nearest mobile money agent is associated with significant reduction 
in the household’s likelihood and amount of saving, credit and remittances. Asset wealth 
plays an integral role in facilitating household credit access, possibly because asset-rich 
households could use their asset base as collateral to obtain larger amounts of credit relative 
to their asset-poor counterparts. Households headed by more educated members make 
significantly more savings and receive more remittances and credit. This could be a reflection 
of either their relative financial literacy or the presence of salary-earning members who may 
use their salaries as collateral to obtain formal credit from banks and MFIs.  
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As presented earlier, summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that households that 
use mobile money are systematically different from non-users along observable 
characteristics which could confound our results. To address this concern, we adopt a 
propensity score matching technique to reduce observable household heterogeneity by 
comparing both the probability and amount of financial service transactions between mobile 
money users and comparable non-users. We further force a common support by considering 
only observations whose estimated propensity scores are bounded within 0.1 and 0.9, a range 
that is considered to deliver reliable estimates (Crump et al. (2008a).  Finally, we run 
regressions weighted by the propensity score, controlling for a full set of household and 
village characteristics to further control for any remaining observable household 
heterogeneity after the matching exercise (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). This approach is 
highly robust and thus constitutes our preferred strategy. 
Results reported in Table 6 are consistent with our previous estimates; mobile money 
adoption significantly increases the probability that a households saves, borrows and receives 
remittances and the corresponding amounts of these financial services are significantly 
higher among user-households. Most of the other controls have insignificant coefficients, 
reflecting the fact that observable heterogeneity was successfully removed by the matching 
method. Finally, Table 7 reports results from covariate balance tests before and after 
matching. P-values for the equality of means of most covariates smaller than 0.05 before 
matching but larger than 0.1 after matching, indicating that covariates were unbalanced 
before matching but became balanced after matching. Rejecting the hypothesis of joint 
equality of means after matching shows that covariates for mobile money users and non-
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users are drawn from comparable distributions (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Additionally, 
a mean absolute bias of 3.4% is far smaller than the 5% recommended to yield reliable 
estimates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
[ Insert Table 6 here ] 
[ Insert Table 7 here ]We disaggregate the amount of credit received by the household into 
formal and informal categories to investigate the two possible pathways through which 
mobile money access could influence the credit behavior of the household. As noted before, 
the first possible channel could be the facilitation of informal borrowing arrangements among 
family members, friends, individual money lenders and members of local savings and credit 
associations made possible by the availability of a convenient remittance channel. The second 
channel is rather less straightforward; the recent interlinkage between mobile network 
operators and banking institutions – commercial banks and MFIs – allowed for the 
interconnectivity of mobile money accounts and bank accounts. This innovation allows users 
to freely move funds between the two types of accounts and could have made it swifter for 
banking institutions to market their loan products to mobile money users through short 
messaging service (SMS) and disseminate loan proceeds to borrowers without requiring them 
to physically travel to bank branches. It is also possible that the interlinkage could have 
increased service satisfaction among customers using interlinked bank and mobile money 
accounts, increasing their demand for loan products. Results in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 
confirm that both pathways are at play; both informal and formal credit increases with mobile 
money possession. However, as noted earlier, the informal channel is stronger, indicating the 
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ease associated with mobile money in exchanging informal microcredit among members of 
informal social networks and private money lenders. 
[ Insert Table 8 here ] 
5.3. Mechanisms: Usage Financial Service Providers. 
Table 9 presents estimation results from a system of seemingly unrelated regressions that 
take into account potentially interdependence in household’s decisions to adopt the four 
financial service providers – mobile money, bank, SACCO and MFI. For each of the four 
financial service providers, the dependent variables in Columns 1 to 4 are binary indicators 
taking one if the household used the respective service provider within a year preceding the 
survey while the frequency of using the service providers is presented in Columns 5 to 8. 
Columns 1 and 4 respectively reveal that the probability of using mobile money services 
reduces by eight percentage points and 24 percent when the distance from the village center 
to the nearest mobile money agent doubles. Distances to the nearest bank, SACCO and MFI 
do not significantly enter into the household decision to adopt these institutions. One possible 
explanation in the case of bank adoption is that no matter how close the household may be 
to the bank premises, sign-up documentation as well as actual and/or perceived cost of 
account opening and maintenance may impose additional restrictions to the up-take of bank 
accounts. The significantly positive coefficient on log of asset value rather stresses the 
relative importance of household wealth, implying that asset-wealthy households can afford 
to use bank services despite the long distances they have to travel to access these services. 
The education level of the household head is positively associated with a higher likelihood 
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and frequency of using mobile money and banks, which may reflect the literacy role in 
shaping financial behavior.   
[ Insert Table 9 here ] 
5.4. Robustness checks. 
5.4.1. Endogeneity of mobile money adoption. 
In all previous results, we treated mobile money adoption as exogenous to the 
household. However, this is unlikely because households who normally save or borrow 
money and receive remittances may adopt mobile money services to ease the flow of these 
services. In this case, causation runs in the reverse direction and this implies potential 
endogeneity of mobile money adoption due to simultaneous effects. The default approach in 
this case would be to run instrumental variable regressions in a 2SLS framework using 
distance to the mobile money agent as an instrument for mobile money adoption. We instead 
add a control function approach to our Tobit models to establish a causal link between mobile 
money adoption and financial service amounts while taking into account the corner solution 
problem in our outcome variables.13  In the first step, we run probit models for mobile money 
adoption on all exogenous variables including log of distance to the nearest mobile money 
agent (results not shown) and obtain predicted residuals which we add as an extra covariate 
in the (second-step) outcome regressions. The results reported in the odd-numbered columns 
of Table 4 show that the mobile money coefficient remains strongly significant. The positive 
                                                          
13 From this point throughout the analysis that follows, we refer to this approach as Tobit-CF. 
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coefficient on the predicted residuals in savings and credit regressions indicates that the 
endogeneity of mobile money imposed an upward bias on our Tobit estimates of these 
variables. Luckily, the inclusion of auxiliary residuals in our Tobit models not only checks 
for endogeneity but also alleviates its confounding power (Wooldridge, 2003; Mason, 2013).  
5.4.2. Alternative Explanations. 
We presume that the distance to the mobile money agent is independent of household and 
village characteristics because mobile money agents were, in most cases, already established 
shop keepers in the villages selling household merchandize and airtime cards, who later took 
on mobile money as an additional service on their service menus when this financial platform 
was introduced in the country in 2009. This differs from the case where non-resident mobile 
money entrepreneurs self-select into the villages they perceive to be profitable. Nonetheless, 
we appreciate the possibility that already established shop keepers could decide whether or 
not to extend their range of services to cover mobile money, basing on the local economic 
potential of villages, which could be a reflection of potential demand from the residents. A 
profit-oriented mobile money agent would consider the local economic potential of the 
village and locate in the village town, which is often closer to the district headquarters 
(district town). However, we control for distance from the village center to the nearest district 
town in all our regressions and our estimates remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar 
to those without this control (unreported). 
The second concern relates to the possibility that banks, SACCOs and MFIs could 
have mobilized savings and credit during or prior to our study period. If this was the case, 
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our estimates would be capturing the spurious correlation between mobile money adoption 
and the up-take of financial services. However, for 90 percent of our sample villages, the 
nearest banks and MFIs are available in the district town and controlling for this distance 
provides a remedy to this problem. It is important to note, however, that SACCOs are 
available in most villages and the distance to the district town does not necessarily affect 
their power to infiltrate and mobilize financial service up-take among rural households. We 
therefore control for the distance to the nearest SACCO, a dummy variable for household 
membership to SACCOs and binary indicators for whether a SACCO is present in the village 
in Tables 4, 5 and 6 and our results remain highly robust14.  
5.4.3. Attrition 
The final check for the robustness of our results is a test for the possibility of attrition bias. 
As discussed in earlier sections, we were able to follow 820 out the 916 households that were 
sampled in the fourth round of RePEAT in 2012. This represents a 10.5 percent attrition rate 
which could bias our results if the households that could not be interviewed in 2014 
systematically differ from those that were successfully interviewed. We therefore regress the 
attrition indicator on key household and village characteristics and show OLS and Probit 
results respectively in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10. The results reveal no systematic 
differences between households that were interviewed in 2014 and those that were missed, 
suggesting that attrition bias does not confound our main results. 
                                                          
14 We control for these variables separately due to collinearity. However, we report only results with distance 
to SACCO and district town to save space. Moreover, results were qualitatively similar across all specifications.  
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6. Conclusion 
As lack of access to financial services remains a key challenge to many people in developing 
countries, the advent of mobile phone-based financial platforms has been changing the 
financial livelihoods of the rural poor. Mobile money – a financial innovation that allows the 
user to deposit, exchange and withdraw money using their mobile phone – is a cheap and 
convenient option for majority of the financially excluded rural populace.  
We explore the role of this financial product in shaping the financial behavior of rural 
households in Uganda using a randomly selected sample of 820 households. We provide 
empirical evidence that mobile money leverages the financial access constraint of rural 
households and stimulates their uptake of financial services. Accounting for possible 
selection bias, endogeneity of mobile money adoption at the household level and the 
influence of local economic conditions at the village level, we provide robust evidence that 
the amounts of remittances, credit and savings made by mobile money users is significantly 
higher than that of non-users. Our results feed into existing literature in two ways; first, by 
profiling the potential of mobile money to drive remittance flow and second, by illustrating 
that reducing service cost and distance to service points improves the saving behavior of rural 
households. This paper uniquely contributes to the literature by extending the analysis of the 
potential of mobile money beyond the traditional peer-to-peer remittances to credit and 
saving services.  
We illustrate that the main mechanism of this observed effect is the reduction of 
distance to service points, as mobile money agents are located in almost all the sub-counties 
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in our study areas. We therefore postulate that access to mobile money services reduces the 
burden in terms of transport and time cost associated with remittance and informal credit 
exchange among family members and friends and  boosts temporary savings to facilitate 
school fees and farm investments. The cross-sectional nature of our data, however, does not 
allow us to rule out the potential effect of unobserved household fixed attributes that could 
influence the observed financial behavior and we leave this issue for future research. In the 
case of remittances, this concern was alleviated using household fixed effects models in 
Munyegera and Matsumoto (forthcoming). Nonetheless, our results suggest a critical policy 
implication that enhancing access to convenient and affordable financial services has a great 
potential to boost financial access among the rural poor who are often excluded from the 
formal financial system. This enhanced access could improve their financial behavior and 
augment their capacity to smooth consumption, safeguard against vulnerabilities in their lives 
and make productive investments, eventually redeeming themselves from poverty. 
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Table 1: Access to and Usage of Financial Services by Mobile Money Adoption Status 
in 2014 
 Non-adopters Adopters  Difference 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD  Mean 
Usage of financial services       
1 if saved money in past 12 months 0.56 0.50 0.80 0.39  0.24*** 
1 if borrowed money in past 12 months 0.48 0.50 0.69 0.46  0.21*** 
Amount saved in past 12 months (1,000 UGX) 196 431 664 1,415  468*** 
Amount borrowed in past 12 months (1,000 UGX) 138 305 619 1,248  481*** 
1 if owns bank account 0.13 0.32 0.41 0.49  0.28*** 
1 if belongs to SACCO 0.53 0.49 0.65 0.47  0.12*** 
1 if used an MFI 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.34  0.08*** 
1 if received remittance 0.62 0.48 0.72 0.44  0.10*** 
Total value of remittances (1,000 UGX) 325 826 702 1,350  377*** 
Access to financial services       
1 if bank available in LC1 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.32  0.06** 
1 if mobile money agent available in LC1 0.35 0.47 0.48 0.49  0.13*** 
1 if MFI available in LC1 0.08 0.26 0.10 0.29  0.02 
1 if SACCO available in LC1 0.56 0.49 0.61 0.48  0.05 
Distance from LC1 to nearest bank 54.84 87.72 53.20 85.88  1.64 
Distance from LC1 to nearest MM Agent (km) 4.73 4.10 3.76 3.88  0.97*** 
Distance from LC1 to nearest MFI (km) 27.31 29.28 23.84 27.52  -3.47 
Distance from LC1 to nearest SACCO (km) 5.86 10.76 6.16 11.64  0.30 
Observations 242 574   
Note: Authors’ Computation based on RePEAT4 and MM2014.The average exchange rate during the 
survey period was UGX 2,600 per USD 1(Bank of Uganda, 2014). Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 
significance of mean difference at one, five and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 2: Household and Village Characteristics by Mobile Money Adoption Status in 
2014 
 Non-adopters Adopters  Difference 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD  Mean 
Household characteristics       
1 if owns any mobile phone 0.54 0.49 0.89 0.31  0.35*** 
Total value of assets (1,000 UGX) 681 1,344 1,236 2,126  555*** 
Land size (hectare) 5.02 5.51 6.91 8.75  1.89*** 
Household size 6.26 3.29 7.33 3.47  1.07*** 
Age of household head 52.83 15.32 51.64 13.57  -1.19 
1 if female head 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35  0.03 
Head years of schooling 4.40 3.49 6.48 3.84  2.08*** 
Village characteristics        
Distance (km) from LC1 to nearest district town 11.03 0 .56 9.86 0 .36  1.16* 
       
Observations 242 574   
Note: Authors’ Computation based on RePEAT4 and MM2014.The average exchange rate during the 
survey period was UGX 2,600 per USD 1(Bank of Uganda, 2014). Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 
significance of mean difference at one, five and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Financial Service Usage: Marginal Effects from Probit 
Regression 
 Pr(Savings=1) Pr(Credit=1) Pr(Remittance=1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
1 if used mobile money 0.249***  0.220***  0.815***  
 (0.0407)  (0.0426)  (0.0298)  
Log(distance to MM Agent)  -0.0213  0.0284  -0.0457* 
  (0.0273)  (0.0306)  (0.0272) 
Education of household head 0.00671 0.0112** 0.00472 0.00994* 0.000236 0.0176*** 
 (0.00500) (0.00486) (0.00538) (0.00530) (0.00595) (0.00508) 
Age of household head 0.00523 0.00631 0.0118 0.0106 -0.0154** -0.0105 
 (0.00763) (0.00748) (0.00882) (0.00904) (0.00723) (0.00753) 
Household size -0.00525 -0.00210 0.00118 0.00405 0.0133** 0.0186*** 
 (0.00535) (0.00535) (0.00592) (0.00591) (0.00569) (0.00585) 
1 if female head 0.0149 0.0248 -0.0517 -0.0409 -0.0577 -0.0127 
 (0.0464) (0.0450) (0.0539) (0.0530) (0.0472) (0.0475) 
Log(total asset value) 0.0249 0.0345* -0.0109 -0.000317 0.0494** 0.0655*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0191) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0179) 
       
Observations 
 
Pseudo R-Squared 
785 
 
0.124 
785 
 
0.083 
785 
 
0.090 
785 
 
0.066 
785 
 
0.654 
785 
 
 
0.191 
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the village level in 
parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at one, five and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Included controls not shown in the table include district dummies. A mobile money dummy is used as a poxy 
for access to mobile money services in odd-numbered columns. In even-numbered columns, mobile money 
access is measured by physical distance to the nearest mobile money agent. 
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Table 4: Amount (in log) of Remittances, Credit and Savings: Tobit Model with CF and full Controls 
        Log(Savings Amount) Log(Credit Amount) Log(Remittance Amount) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
1 if used mobile money 0.817*** 0.820*** 0.685*** 0.654*** 0.840** 0.766** 
 (0.234) (0.251) (0.123) (0.133) (0.364) (0.387) 
First stage residual  1.517**  0.650*  -0.604 
  (0.671)  (0.368)  (1.044) 
Log(Distance to district town) -0.0554 -0.0509 -0.0277 -0.0205 -0.170 -0.138 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.0964) (0.0969) (0.284) (0.284) 
1 if migrant worker present 0.0620 0.00338 -0.217 -0.236* 0.750** 0.775** 
 (0.235) (0.236) (0.142) (0.142) (0.355) (0.361) 
1 if SACCO available in LC1 0.117 0.127 0.0110 0.0135 0.377 0.421 
 (0.267) (0.268) (0.160) (0.161) (0.413) (0.414) 
Head years of schooling 0.0329 0.00728 0.0308* 0.0191 0.0351 0.0461 
 (0.0292) (0.0310) (0.0184) (0.0197) (0.0448) (0.0478) 
Age of household head 0.0129 0.0127 -0.00335 -0.00220 -0.0160 -0.00632 
 (0.0473) (0.0475) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0690) (0.0691) 
Log value of land currently held 0.0674 -0.00721 0.0348 -0.00304 0.491* 0.527* 
 (0.170) (0.174) (0.106) (0.107) (0.265) (0.271) 
Household size -0.0664* -0.0854** -0.00351 -0.0140 -0.0392 -0.0321 
 (0.0346) (0.0361) (0.0188) (0.0196) (0.0507) (0.0519) 
1 if female head -0.311 -0.327 -0.211 -0.222 1.122*** 1.101*** 
 (0.306) (0.308) (0.163) (0.164) (0.411) (0.412) 
Log value of total assets 0.190* 0.140 0.114* 0.0937 0.993*** 1.011*** 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.0633) (0.0652) (0.158) (0.160) 
Observations 770 770 770 770 770 770 
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at one, five and ten percent levels, 
respectively. Included controls not shown in the table include district dummies and a squared term of age of household head and land holding 
size. 
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Table 5: Adoption and Amount of Financial Services: Marginal Effects from Reduced Form Tobit 
 Pr(Saving=1) Log(Savings 
Amount) 
Pr(Credit=1) Log(Credit 
Amount) 
Pr(Remit=1) Log(Remit 
Amount) 
       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log(distance to MM Agent) -0.0547* -0.371** -0.0278* -0.143* -0.0814** -0.328** 
 (0.0319) (0.181) (0.0253) (0.0863) (0.0337) (0.141) 
Log(distance in km to bank) 0.0387 0.238 0.0294* 0.0719 0.0492** 0.233** 
 (0.0217) (0.124) (0.0173) (0.0570) (0.0244) (0.109) 
Log(distance in km to SACCO) -0.00990 -0.0544 0.00161 -0.0398 0.00789 -0.0321 
 (0.0217) (0.130) (0.0182) (0.0635) (0.0236) (0.0937) 
Log(distance in km to MFI) -0.00398 -0.0129 -0.0228 -0.0287 -0.00170 0.00445 
 (0.0216) (0.123) (0.0182) (0.0631) (0.0235) (0.103) 
Head years of schooling 0.00880* 0.0670** 0.00516 0.0376** 0.0154*** 0.0974*** 
 (0.00514) (0.0295) (0.00503) (0.0180) (0.00566) (0.0231) 
Age of household head 0.00268 0.0150 0.000982 -0.0123 -0.0107 -0.0384 
 (0.00805) (0.0498) (0.00848) (0.0299) (0.00864) (0.0366) 
Household size -0.00565 -0.0427 0.00390 0.000409 0.0146** 0.0592** 
 (0.00559) (0.0359) (0.00560) (0.0195) (0.00603) (0.0253) 
1 if female head -0.0212 -0.266 -0.0562 -0.195 -0.0314 -0.225 
 (0.0508) (0.311) (0.0513) (0.167) (0.0520) (0.210) 
Log value of total assets 0.0365* 0.260** 0.00211 0.163*** 0.0469** 0.310*** 
 (0.0187) (0.112) (0.0175) (0.0622) (0.0192) (0.0821) 
       
Observations 784 784 784 784 784 784 
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at one, five and ten percent levels, 
respectively. Other controls include district dummies, log of distance to district town, a squared term of age of household head and land holding 
size. 
35 
 
Table 6: Weighted Regression Analysis Based on Propensity Score  
 Pr(Savings=1) Log(Savings) Pr(Credit=1) Log(Credit) Pr(Remit=1) Log(Remittance) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
1 if used mobile money 0.172*** 0.534*** 0 .140** 0.680*** 0 .637*** 0.639** 
 (0.054) (0.168) (0 .055) (0.127) (0 .038) (0.321) 
Head years of schooling 0.005 0.0507 0.009 0.0611** -0.00002 0.0456 
 (0.006) (0.0327) (0.006) (0.0251) (0.005) (0.0292) 
Age of household head 0.001 0.00246 0.003 -0.00531 -0.011 -0.0167 
 (0.008) (0.0422) (0.008) (0.0353) (0.005) (0.0345) 
Household size -0.002 -0.0369 0.0006 -0.0114 0.002 0.0332 
 (0 .006) (0.0352) (0.007) (0.0264) (0.004) (0.0311) 
1 if female head -0.019 -0.168 -0.046 -0.177 -0.079 0.347 
 (0.051) (0.280) (0.054) (0.206) (0.040) (0.259) 
Log(distance to MM Agent) -0.034 -0.253 0.032 0.165 -0.002 0.0739 
 (0.034) (0.190) (0.036) (0.145) (0.025) (0.179) 
Log(distance in km to bank) 0.026 0.170 0.018 0.0602 0.021 0.195* 
 (0.022) (0.121) (0.023) (0.0903) (0.016) (0.111) 
Log(distance in km to SACCO) -0.008 -0.0727 0.003 0.0128 0.016 0.117 
 (0.022) (0.129) (0.024) (0.100) (0.015) (0.107) 
Log(distance in km to MFI) -0.006 0.0160 -0.029 -0.101 -0.028 -0.167 
 (0.021) (0.119) (0.023) (0.0925) (0.015) (0.105) 
Log(Distance in km to district town) -0.008 -0.0933 0.022 0.0501 0.043 0.259 
 (0.031) (0.168) (0.035) (0.139) (0.024) (0.160) 
Log value of total assets 0.040** 0.235** -0.003 0.117 0.003 0.0121 
 (0.018) (0.111) (0.020) (0.0905) (0.014) (0.0987) 
       
Observations 673 673 673 673 673 673 
R-squared 0.158 0.200 0.124 0.196 0.550 0.258 
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at one, five and ten percent levels, 
respectively. Additional controls include landholding size, a dummy for the presence of a migrant worker and district dummies. 
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Table 7: Balance Check for Comparability of Covariates before and after Propensity Score Matching 
 Mean before Mean after % |Bias|  
 
Variables MM=1 MM=0 P-value MM=1 MM=0  P-value Reduction 
         
Head years of schooling  5.79 4.12 0.000 5.94 5.96  0.889 89.6 
Age of household head  51.39 52.52 0.326 51.39 50.22  0.194 63.7 
Land size in hectares  5.83 4.51 0.005 5.83 5.48  0.342 78.4 
Household size 6.93 6.15 0.002 6.93 6.86  0.731 91.3 
1 if female head 0.15 0.19 0.25 0.15 0.13  0.466 50.8 
Total assets in 1,000 UGX 850 550 0.000 850 800  0.400 63.2 
Distance in km to MM agent 4.14 4.86 0.030 4.14 4.14  0.989 99.5 
Distance in km to bank 54.24 56.47 0.756 54.24 50.16  0.462 83.0 
Distance in km to SACCO  6.12 6.05 0.938 6.12 5.49  0.388 74.8 
Distance in km to MFI 23.70 27.79 0.074 23.75 23.16  0.444 85.3 
Distance in km to district town 10.41 11.34 0.200 10.41 10.40  0.990 99.2 
1 if owns mobile phone 0.82 0.51 0.000 0.82 0.81  0.279 96.8 
Pseudo R2 - - 0.077 - -  0.006 - 
Mean Bias - - 16.9 - -  3.4 - 
P-value (Joint Mean Equality) - - 0.000 - -  0.724 - 
Balance check before and after PSM for observations for which 0.1<e(X)<0.9. Pseudo R2 indicates how well covariates explain treatment probability; a 
small value after matching indicates goodness of the matching technique (Sianesi, 2004). A standardized absolute mean bias less than 5 after matching 
indicates effective matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). A non-significant p-value for the joint mean equality test after matching shows significant 
similarity between treatment and control groups after matching (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).  
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Table 8: Determinants of Credit Disaggregated by Formal and Informal Categories 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log(Credit) Log(Informal  Credit) Log(Formal Credit) 
    
1 if used mobile money 0.685*** 0.594*** 0.237** 
 (0.174) (0.218) (0.106) 
First stage residual -0.289 0.0497 0.655 
 (0.187) (0.158) (0.485) 
Years using mobile money 0.0385 -0.0174 0.0217 
 (0.0436) (0.0360) (0.0219) 
Years using bank 0.0561*** -0.0365*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0105) (0.00641) 
Years using SACCO 0.000227 0.000289 -0.00128 
 (0.000315) (0.000317) (0.00738) 
Years using MFI 0.223*** 0.0299 0.0806*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0495) (0.0164) 
Education of household head 0.0241 -0.0106 -0.0230 
 (0.0215) (0.0183) (0.0317) 
Household size 0.00781 0.00210 -0.0402 
 (0.0198) (0.0180) (0.0257) 
1 if female head -0.142 -0.120 -0.0904 
 (0.164) (0.143) (0.108) 
    
Observations 773 773 773 
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the village level 
in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at one, five and ten percent levels, 
respectively. Other covariates include log of distance to nearest district town, bank, MFI, SACCO and 
mobile money agent; age and age squared of the household head; log(land size) and log(asset value) 
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Table 9: Adoption and Frequency of Financial Service Providers 
 Adopt service financial providers Frequency of financial service provider usage 
VARIABLES M- Money Bank SACCO MFI M- Money Bank SACCO MFI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Log(distance to MM Agent) -0.0846*** -0.0161 0.0209 0.0203 -0.235** -0.0140 0.0743 0.0208 
 (0.0299) (0.0301) (0.0327) (0.0206) (0.116) (0.0813) (0.119) (0.0483) 
Log(distance in km to bank) 0.0487** 0.0154 -0.00352 -0.00379 0.128* 0.0244 -0.0519 -0.0362 
 (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0210) (0.0132) (0.0720) (0.0507) (0.0740) (0.0301) 
Log(distance in km to SACCO) 0.000255 0.00290 0.00920 0.00288 -0.00591 -0.0200 0.0422 0.00760 
 (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0214) (0.0135) (0.0756) (0.0532) (0.0776) (0.0316) 
Log(distance in km to MFI) 0.00180 -0.0197 -0.0176 -0.00675 -0.0576 -0.0606 0.00372 0.00853 
 (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0209) (0.0131) (0.0718) (0.0505) (0.0737) (0.0300) 
Head years of schooling 0.0184*** 0.0235*** 0.000131 0.00452 0.0652*** 0.0455*** -0.0106 -0.00113 
 (0.00456) (0.00460) (0.00499) (0.00314) (0.0173) (0.0122) (0.0178) (0.00723) 
Age of household head 2.16e-05 -0.0121* 0.00762 -0.00583 -0.0203 -0.0275 0.0199 -0.0127 
 (0.00715) (0.00721) (0.00782) (0.00492) (0.0273) (0.0192) (0.0281) (0.0114) 
Household size 0.0142*** -0.00117 0.00394 0.00796** 0.0452** -0.0109 0.00716 0.0113 
 (0.00502) (0.00507) (0.00550) (0.00346) (0.0193) (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.00809) 
1 if female head 0.0265 0.0404 -0.0199 -0.0200 0.0840 0.0934 -0.147 -0.0703 
 (0.0453) (0.0457) (0.0496) (0.0312) (0.174) (0.123) (0.179) (0.0729) 
Log value of total assets 0.0428*** 0.0885*** -0.0226 -0.00362 0.212*** 0.226*** -0.0790 0.000367 
 (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0178) (0.0112) (0.0615) (0.0433) (0.0631) (0.0257) 
Constant -0.134 -0.526* 0.922*** 0.202 -0.854 -1.308* 2.939*** 0.539 
 (0.286) (0.288) (0.313) (0.197) (1.093) (0.769) (1.122) (0.457) 
         
Observations 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 
R-squared 0.182 0.194 0.126 0.110 0.310 0.168 0.134 0.104 
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at one, five and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Other controls include district dummies, log of distance to district town, a squared term of age of household head and land holding size. 
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Table 10: Correlation between Attrition and Household and Village Characteristics 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS Probit 
   
Log(distance to MM Agent) -0.00324 -0.00496 
 (0.0146) (0.0142) 
Log(distance in km to bank) 0.00337 0.00450 
 (0.00962) (0.00934) 
Log(distance in km to SACCO) 0.0128 0.0111 
 (0.0104) (0.00996) 
Log(distance in km to MFI) -0.0144 -0.0141 
 (0.0101) (0.00971) 
1 if migrant worker present 0.0312 0.0303 
 (0.0229) (0.0236) 
Head years of schooling -0.00372 -0.00376 
 (0.00290) (0.00291) 
Age of household head -0.00635 -0.00510 
 (0.00467) (0.00421) 
Age squared of household head  5.58e-05 4.40e-05 
 (4.23e-05) (3.79e-05) 
Log(land size) -0.000639 1.99e-05 
 (0.0160) (0.0159) 
Household size -0.000992 -0.00103 
 (0.00319) (0.00311) 
1 if female head 0.0406 0.0358 
 (0.0288) (0.0303) 
Log value of total assets -0.0109 -0.0104 
 (0.0101) (0.00967) 
Constant 0.508***  
 (0.171)  
   
Observations 871 871 
R-squared 0.025  
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at one, five 
and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
